The National Transportation Safety Board has released its final report on the February 9, 2024 crash of a Bombardier Challenger 604, determining that corrosion in the variable geometry systems of both engines led to compressor stalls, thrust loss, and the fatal off-airport landing on Interstate 75 near Naples, Florida.
Operated by Hop-A-Jet as a Part 135 on-demand charter flight from Ohio State University Airport, the aircraft with registration N823KD was turning final for runway 23 at Naples Municipal Airport at approximately 2,000 feet when the crew received master warnings for low oil pressure in both engines. Seconds later, the pilots declared an emergency, stating they had lost both engines and would not reach the runway. Cockpit voice recorder transcripts indicate the crew briefly considered ditching before selecting the highway median to avoid traffic.
Dashcam video from a vehicle on the interstate captured the jet aligning with southbound traffic and touching down on the roadway in a shallow left bank. The aircraft then veered right, collided with a non-frangible sign, and impacted a concrete sound barrier. A post-crash fire destroyed much of the forward fuselage and left wing. The cabin attendant and two passengers successfully egressed through the rear baggage compartment door.
Both pilots suffered fatal injuries. The two passengers, cabin attendant, and one motorist on the ground received minor injuries. NTSB examination of the GE CF34-3B engines found no catastrophic mechanical failures, fuel contamination, or anomalies in the fuel control units. However, testing of the variable geometry system, which adjusts stator vane positions to manage high-pressure compressor airflow, revealed extensive corrosion, most severe in the fifth-stage stator vane spindle bores.
Chemical analysis confirmed the corrosion was consistent with sea salt exposure. The jet had operated for years from airports in Barbados and Fort Lauderdale near the ocean. This led to off-schedule vane positioning, slower system response, and higher-than-normal actuation pressures, destabilizing the compressor at low power settings and causing the sub-idle rotating stalls.
Investigators noted the aircraft had suffered a hung start on both engines 25 days before the accident. The operator troubleshot per the GE flowchart, including fuel drainage and filter changes, but did not perform the variable geometry pressure check because it appeared late in the process and the engines later started normally. The jet returned to service and completed 33 flights before the accident. The NTSB cited inadequate manufacturer guidance on fault isolation as a contributing factor.
In response, GE Aerospace has revised troubleshooting flowcharts to prioritize variable geometry checks, issued service bulletins requiring inspections after hung starts, updated maintenance for salty environments, and introduced periodic borescope and functional tests. Hop-A-Jet described the report as an accurate assessment and expressed hope that the lessons will benefit the broader business aviation community.
The case highlights vulnerabilities for CF34-powered business jets operating in marine environments and the critical need for comprehensive troubleshooting that does not overlook lower-priority checks when initial steps appear to resolve symptoms. The aircraft was destroyed.